The role of mobile phones in governance-driven technology exports in Sub-Saharan Africa by Asongu, Simplice & Asongu, Ndemaze
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The role of mobile phones in
governance-driven technology exports in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Simplice Asongu and Ndemaze Asongu
January 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83217/
MPRA Paper No. 83217, posted 8 December 2017 17:42 UTC
1 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/17/036 
 
The role of mobile phones in governance-driven technology exports in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
 
Forthcoming: Journal of the Knowledge Economy  
 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com / asongus@afridev.org   
 
 
Ndemaze Asongu 
Department of Communication Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, 
 University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. 
Email: asongundemaze@gmail.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
2017 African Governance and Development Institute                                                     WP/17/036 
 
Research Department  
 
The role of mobile phones in governance-driven technology exports in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
  
Simplice A. Asongu & Ndemaze Asongu  
 
January 2017 
 
Abstract 
 
This study assesses how the mobile phone influences governance to improve information and 
communication technology (ICT) exports in Sub-Saharan Africa with data from 2000-2012.  
The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and three main 
governance concepts are used, namely: (i) institutional (comprising the rule of law and 
corruption-control); (ii) political (involving political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability) and (iii) economic (including regulation quality and government effectiveness) 
governance. The following findings are established. First, there are positive net effects on ICT 
goods exports from independent interactions between mobile phones and ‘political stability’ 
‘voice and accountability’ and corruption-control. Second, significant net effects are not 
apparent from independent interactions between mobile phones and government 
effectiveness, regulation quality and the rule of law. Theoretical and practical implications are 
discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 It has been widely acknowledged today that the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge over the past decade has been due to the rapid surge in information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) which have considerably mitigated the cost of 
communication and electronic networking. In essence, while the growing affordability of 
modern ICT has enhanced the efficient diffusion of existing knowledge, it has also facilitated 
the means by which new knowledge can be created to improve productivity and promote 
social, business and economic developments (Tchamyou, 2016). This narrative is consistent 
with the ICT literature on social outcomes (Islama & Meadeb, 2012; Amankwah-Amoah & 
Sarpong, 2016; Brouwer & Brito,  2012; Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 2016; Mira & 
Dangersfield, 2012; Asongu et al., 2017) in both developing (Gupta & Jain, 2012; Sonne, 
2012) and developed (Thakar, 2012) countries.  However, a drawback to this trend is that 
countries that are not able to adapt and adjust to the importance of knowledge economy in 21st 
century development will be left-out in the global transition to knowledge based economies. 
Unfortunately, this is the case with much of Africa because the continent’s overall knowledge 
index has dropped over the past decade (Tchamyou, 2016). 
 With the above background in mind, assessing linkages between the mobile phone, 
governance and technology-driven exports in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is  relevant in 
scholarly and policy-making circles for at least four main reasons, notably: (i) the 
comparatively high penetration potential of mobile phones in Africa; (iii) the open debate on 
the relationship between exports and innovation; (iii) apparent gaps in the literature and (iv) 
the role of governance as a policy tool in stimulating industrialisation and trade.  
 First, compared to other emerging economies (in Latin America and Asia) and 
developed countries (in Europe and North America) which are currently experiencing 
saturation levels in ICT penetration, there is yet a great potential for mobile phone penetration 
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in SSA (see Penard et al., 2012; Asongu, 2015). Therefore, this represents an opportunity for 
policy to leverage on the penetration potential of ICT to address development challenges (like 
the low rate of exports) in the sub-region.  
 Second, the relationship between exports and innovation is still subject to debate. 
Whereas a strand in the literature supports the non exogenous  association between 
productivity and exports (Bernard & Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003), another view is of the 
position that prior to exporting, firms enhance their productivity but have post-entry 
productivity rewards (Aw et al., 2009).  Consistent with Harris and Moffat (2011), it is more 
likely that causality flows to both directions because while ‘innovating’ affects a firm’s 
decision to export, innovation is also affected by the ‘learning to exporting’ effect. 
 Third, contemporary literature has failed to engage the connection between ICT and 
technology exports in SSA despite the growing relevance of knowledge economy and 
decreasing importance Africa’s global share of trade. Accordingly, despite the strong 
relationship between investments in ICT and trade, SSA is not being given the scholarly 
attention it deserves in spite of the established importance of trade in economic prosperity 
(IMF, 2008; NEPAD , 2008; UNCTAD, 2009) and declining SSA’s share in global trade 
since the 1970s (IMF, 2008; UNCTAD, 2009).  Moreover, recent literature on ICT for 
development purposes has focused on two main streams.   The first strand which deals with 
the use of ICT for entrepreneurial opportunities include: emphasis on entrepreneurs who are 
continuously innovating because of evolving skills and financial resources (Best, 2015); the 
discovery and creation of new innovation opportunities (Wan et al., 2015; Hang et al., 2015); 
technological innovations that are offering new avenues due to road-mapping of patents 
(Jeong & Yoon, 2015);  business opportunities that are associated with an ageing population 
(Kohlbacher et al., 2015) and growing ecosystems (Overholm,  2015); opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in scientific fields (Maine et al., 2015) and research collaborations (McKelvey 
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et al., 2015). The second strand which deals with the employment of ICT for economic 
development in the developing world is concerned with, inter alia: economic prosperity 
(Qureshi, 2013a; Levendis & Lee, 2013); standards of living (Chavula, 2013); sustainable 
economic development (Byrne et al., 2011);   progress within the financial sector (Kamel, 
2005); better life for all (Kivuneki et al., 2011); inclusive development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a) and externalities in welfare (Qureshi, 2013bc; Carmody, 2013).      
 Fourth, inter alia: corruption (Musila & Sigué, 2010) and absence of good governance 
(Kayizzi-Mugerwa et al., 2014) are some poor governance policy syndromes1 that are 
reducing and/or limiting Africa’s share in the global trade.  While good governance is 
considered as the main independent variable of interest, mobile phone penetration is used as a 
policy variable.   In order to improve room for policy implications, three principal governance 
categories are employed, namely: political governance (involving voice & accountability and 
political stability/no violence); economic governance (covering regulation quality and 
government effectiveness) and institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and 
corruption-control). “Political governance is defined as the election and replacement of 
political leaders. Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of rules that 
enable the delivery of public goods and services. Institutional governance is the respect of the 
state and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them” (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b, p. 2)  
In the light of the above, the research question this study aims to address is: how does   
the mobile phone complement governance in affecting technology-driven exports?  In other 
words, the study seeks to understand how governance can be innovated with the mobile phone 
                                                          
1
 Fosu (2013), defines ‘policy syndromes’ as situations that are detrimental to growth: ‘administered 
redistribution’, ‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation’. 
Situations in which such syndromes are not apparent are qualified as ‘syndrome-free’. The policy syndromes are 
thought to have substantially contributed to Africa’s poor post-independence growth.  
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for an export-led (or extensive) development strategy. The rest of the study is organised as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings while the data and methodology are 
engaged in Section 3. Section 4 presents results whereas Section 5 concludes with 
implications and future research directions.   
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings  
In accordance with Harris and Moffat (2011), there are two principal theoretical 
underpinnings in the macroeconomic literature on the relationship between exporting and 
innovation. In essence, for the most part, the narrative does not make much distinction 
between research and development (hence R&D) and innovation, essentially because inputs 
resulting from innovation (e.g. R&D) lead to new commodities and processes. On the one 
hand, neo-endowment models have fundamentally articulated on specialisation and hence on 
the competitive advantage with respect to factor endowments such as technology, 
skilled/unskilled labour and capital. On the other hand, neo-technology models are centred for 
example on the technology gap theory on trade and the product life cycle theory.   
 Consistent with Wangwe (1995), some inquiries which are closely associated with 
long-term economic prosperity have put emphasis on patterns of trade as well as linkages with 
time-related cross-sector and cross-country tendencies.  For the most part, the studies have 
provided robust results on the impact of innovation in international competiveness and 
growth. The narrative also borders with neo-technology models that have attempted to 
endogenize technology processes within the context of open economy equilibrium models 
(see Spencer, 1981).  
 An associated strand of the literature is of the position that exports can equally be 
influenced by innovation. In essence,  with respect to this  viewpoint on models of 
endogenous growth (see Aghion & Howitt, 1998;  Hobday, 1995), it is vital for corporations 
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to continuously innovate in view of adapting to constantly growing challenges in foreign 
markets. Furthermore, a ‘learning to export effect’ exist which is due to growing exposure to 
new technology and knowledge. This narrative is in accordance with Spencer (1981) on a 
learning curve which has consolidated the position of the international trade theory.  In more 
contemporary literature, a dynamic model has been employed by Aw et al. (2009) to 
emphasise the closed connection between exporting and innovation:  “… each activity alters 
the future return from undertaking the other activity, thus current R&D directly impacts the 
probability of exporting and current exporting alters the return to R&D” (Aw et. al., 2009, 
p.3). Note should be taken of the fact that productivity is endogenous to a corporation’s 
capacity of innovation.   
 There is a wealth of empirical literature on the relationship between innovation and 
exporting. Unfortunately, as maintained by Harris and Moffat (2011), much of this literature 
has focused on emerging countries without Africa on the one hand and on the other, 
developed nations. Accordingly, changes in the structure of ICT have been documented to 
enhance trade in both the emerging countries of Asia (e.g. Singapore, South Korea and 
Malaysia) and advanced nations (e.g. the United States) (Ngwenyama et al., 2006; Wang, 
1999; Avgerou, 1998).  There is an established consensus in the underlying literature on a 
positive nexus between a nation’s  knowledge accumulation (and/or capacity of innovation) 
and its exporting capacity (Salim & Bloch, 2009; Leon-Ledesma, 2005;  DiPietro & Anoruo, 
2006).  Some studies have also emphasised the relevance of technology and innovation as key 
drivers in enhancing export performance, facilitating entry into global markets and 
consolidating competitiveness. Within this strand, it has been shown by Salim and Bloch 
(2009) that there is causality flowing from innovation to exports. 
 With the above insights, the mobile phone can complement or innovate governance in 
improving trade essentially because ICT has been documented to improve governance 
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standards. Moreover, from an intuitive standpoint, mobile phones should contribute towards 
reducing information asymmetry that constraint trade.  In the narratives that follow, we first 
discuss the connection between ICT and governance before stating the main hypotheses to be 
tested. Consistent with Hellstrom (2008), ICT can be employed to enhance governance 
because, it inter alia, facilitates openness, transparency and the quasi-flow of information 
between various government departments and institutions. The underpinnings maintain that 
the decentralisation of information by means of the mobile phone reduces opportunities for 
bad governance. This narrative is consistent with the bulk of literature on the nexus between 
governance and ICT (see Suarez, 2006; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 
2014)2.  In the light of these background and underpinnings, the hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical section are as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 1: the mobile phone complements political governance to improve technology 
exports. Political governance represents appealing conditions in the election and replacement 
of political leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 2: the mobile phone complements economic governance to enhance technology 
exports. Economic governance represents the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities. 
 
Hypothesis 3: the mobile phone complements institutional governance to consolidate 
technology exports. Institutional governance is the respect by citizens and the State of 
institutions that govern interactions between them.  
                                                          
2
 It is relevant to balance the narrative with a contending strand of the literaure which argues that ICT can also 
facilated collective violent action (see Manacorda & Tesei, 2016; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Pierskalla  & 
Hollenbach, 2013; Breuer et al., 2012).  
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Whereas the testable hypotheses are linked to the theoretical literature, we now engage 
how the underlying hypotheses steer clear of existing empirical knowledge economy 
literature. In essence, the positioning of the study deviates from recent literature on 
knowledge economy which has focused on the importance of ICT in development outcomes, 
inter alia in: financial sector development for financial access (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017); electricity consumption and economic growth (Shahbaz  et al., 2016);  regional 
economic performance (Ahmed, 2010; Ahmed & Ridzuan, 2013; Kleibrink et al., 2015); 
financial development (Das et al., 2016); Research and Development (R&D) for business 
value (Costello & Donnellan, 2016); R&D intensity and economic growth (Sağlam, 2016); 
university education (public and private) (Nour, 2016);  human capital spillovers for 
knowledge-based economies (Ahmed, 2016; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017) and technical regimes 
and production networks (Murphy  & Carmody, 2015).    
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of forty-nine countries in SSA with data from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank 
for the period 2000-2012. The engaged periodicity is contingent on data availability 
constraints while the scope of SSA is in accordance with the motivation of the study3. 
Consistent with recent African business literature, ICT good exports is used as a proxy for 
technology good exports (Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016).  
 Six governance measurements from three principal categories are used, namely: 
political governance (involving voice & accountability and political stability/no violence); 
economic governance (covering regulation quality and government effectiveness) and 
                                                          
3
 Data points for the year 2015 are only available in the 2017 release of World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. This is essentially because there is always a two year lag between the most updated year in the data 
and the publication year of the data. At the time of the study, the most updated year was 2012. 
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institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and corruption-control). The governance 
variables which are from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been used extensively in recent 
governance literature (Andrés et al., 2015; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Gani, 2011). The policy 
or modifying variable is the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people).   
  Four control variables are adopted in accordance with recent African business 
literature (Tchamyou, 2016), namely:  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, trade 
openness, cost of exports and foreign direct investment (FDI).  Upon a preliminary empirical 
assessment, accounting for more than four control variables leads to instrument proliferation 
or over-identification that substantially biases estimated coefficients. From intuition, we 
expect GDP growth, trade openness and FDI to positively affect the outcome variable 
whereas the cost of exports should have the opposite effect. However, the intuition motivating 
these expected signs should be taken with caution because the   relationships are also 
contingent of economic dynamism and expansion. For instance, if the economy is skewed 
towards heavy extractive industries and GDP growth is not broad-based but limited to the 
underlying extractive sectors, the anticipated signs may be counterintuitive.  
The definitions of  the variables and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 
1 whereas the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix which is 
used to reduce potential concerns about multicollinearity is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
3. 2 Methodology 
 The study adopts the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach 
for four main reasons. First, the number of periods per cross section (T=13) is substantially 
lower than the number of countries or cross-sections (N=49). Second, cross-country 
differences are not eliminated since the GMM is consistent with panel data analysis. Third, 
the system estimator considers inherent biases in the difference estimator. Fourth,  the 
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estimation procedure accounts for  endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity in the 
explanatory variables using an instrumentation process. Furthermore, the employment of 
time-invariant indicators also improves the bite on endogeneity.   
 Borrowing from Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator (see Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has better estimation properties when compared to the 
difference estimator (see Arellano & Bond, 1991). The Roodman (2009ab) extension of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) is preferred because it has been established to limit instrument 
proliferation and account for cross-sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008; Boateng et al., 2016). Therefore, as opposed to first differences,  the extended 
estimation procedure adopts forward orthogonal deviations. A two-step procedure is adopted 
instead of one-step approach because it addresses concerns of heteroscedasticity given that the 
one-step procedure only controls for homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiTExp ,
 
is a technology export indicator in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant,
 
G  
is a governance variable (political stability, voice & accountability, regulation quality, 
government effectiveness, corruption-control and the rule of law),  M  represents mobile 
phone penetration, GM is the interaction between a governance variable  and mobile phone 
penetration, 
 
W  is the vector of control variables (GDP growth, trade openness, cost of 
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exports and foreign direct investment),
 
 represents the coefficient of auto-regression, t
 
is 
the time-specific constant
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 It is important to allocate space to engage exclusion restrictions and identification 
properties in the GMM regression. All explanatory indicators are considered as predetermined 
or suspected endogenous and exclusively time-invariant variables or years are considered to 
be strictly exogenous (also see Boateng et al., 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). This 
exclusive restriction is based on the fact that, it is very unlikely for time invariant variables to 
become endogenous in first difference (Roodman, 2009b)4.  
 Given the above, years affect the technology exports outcome indicators exclusively 
via the suspected endogenous variables. Moreover, the statistical importance of the exclusion 
restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  
In essence, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected for the time-invariant 
indicators to explain the technology exports exclusively via the predetermined variables. 
Therefore, in the results that are presented in Section 4, the hypothesis of exclusion restriction 
is confirmed if the null hypothesis of the DHT concerned with the instrumental variables (IV) 
(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. This is consistent with the standard IV procedure in which, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an 
indication that the instruments influence the technology export variables beyond the suggested 
predetermined variable channels (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d).  
 
 
 
 
4.  Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
                                                          
4
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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Whereas Table 1 presents findings related to political stability, voice and accountability and 
government effectiveness, Table 2 reveals results corresponding to regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law. There are two specifications pertaining to each 
governance variable: one without a conditioning information set and the other with a 
conditioning information set. For all tables: (i) four information criteria are used to examine 
the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations5 and (ii) a net effect is 
computed to assess the effect of mobile phones in governance for technology exports. For 
example, in Table 1 in the second column, the net effect from the interaction between mobile 
phones and political stability is 0.046 ([-0.003× 23.379] + 0.117),  where: the mean value of 
mobile phone penetration is 23.379, the unconditional effect of political stability is 0.117 
while the conditional effect from the interaction between political stability and mobile phones 
is -0.003.  
The following findings can be established on the linkages between governance, mobile 
phone penetration and technology exports. First, there are positive net effects on ICT goods 
exports from independent interaction between mobile phones and ‘political stability’ ‘voice 
and accountability’ and corruption-control. Second, significant net effects are not apparent 
from the interaction between mobile phones and government effectiveness, regulation quality 
and the rule of law. Third, most of the control variables are significant. The unexpected 
negative effects from GDP growth and FDI may be respectively traceable to growth and 
external investment resources that are skewed towards specific sectors like intensive 
industries.  
                                                          
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2016, p.200). 
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Table 1: Governance, mobile phones and ICT good exports 
       
 Dependent variable: ICT goods exports   
       
 
  Political Stability (PolS) Voice & Accountability(VA)  Government Effectiveness (GE) 
 
   
Constant  0.057 0.373 0.096 0.864 0.226** 0.563 
 (0.398) (0.638) (0.476) (0.210) (0.015) (0.292) 
ICT good exports (-1) 0.744*** 0.564*** 0.796*** 0.648*** 0.775*** 0.631*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.277) (0.093) (0.478) (0.616) (0.434) (0.699) 
Political Stability 0.117** 0.097* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.048) (0.063)     
Voice & Accountability --- --- 0.209** 0.119 --- --- 
   (0.034) (0.496)   
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- 0.218 0.224 
     (0.110) (0.240) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.003* -0.001* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.082) (0.057)     
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- --- -0.002* -0.0002 --- --- 
   (0.089) (0.909)   
‘Government 
Effectiveness’×Mob 
--- --- --- --- -0.002 -0.001 
     (0.165) (0.578) 
GDP growth --- -0.013*** --- -0.006 --- -0.009 
  (0.007)  (0.299)  (0.204) 
Trade   --- 0.008*** --- 0.003 --- 0.0002 
  (0.004)  (0.433)  (0.923) 
Cost to export (ln) --- -0.069 --- -0.113 --- -0.036 
  (0.517)  (0.318)  (0.602) 
Foreign Direct Investment   --- -0.008* --- -0.008 --- -0.006 
  (0.074)  (0.315)  (0.344) 
       
Net Effects  0.046 0.073 0.162 na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.228) (0.068) (0.253) (0.078) (0.249) (0.075) 
AR(2) (0.335) (0.965) (0.344) (0.674) (0.342) (0.767) 
Sargan OIR (0.877) (0.003) (0.942)  (0.022) (0.710) (0.005) 
Hansen OIR (0.597) (0.884) (0.566) (0.996) (0.655) (0.994) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.893) (0.886) (0.709) (0.957) (0.645) (0.972) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.359) (0.718) (0.403) (0.974) (0.532) (0.952) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.841) (0.897) (0.182) (0.986) (0.398) (0.946) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.506) (0.533) (0.652) (0.902) (0.635) (0.991) 
       
Fisher  1314.29*** 1676.63*** 2468.95*** 17733.72*** 1672.93*** 10464.83*** 
Instruments  24 37 24 37 24 37 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  305 212 305 212 305 212 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant. The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 23.379. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Governance, mobile phones and ICT good exports 
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 Dependent variable: ICT goods exports   
       
 
Regulation Quality(RQ) Corruption-Control  (CC) Rule of Law (RL) 
Constant  0.103 -0.553 -0.041 1.403* 0.063 -0.814 
 (0.184) (0.574) (0.621) (0.078) (0.646) (0.427) 
ICT good exports (-1)  0.791*** 0.666*** 0.752*** 0.625*** 0.810*** 0.639*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.0002 -0.006* 0.0003 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.003 
 (0.833) (0.059) (0.747) (0.288) (0.832) (0.424) 
Regulation Quality 0.152 0.337* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.241) (0.057)     
Corruption Control --- --- 0.194** -0.001 --- --- 
   (0.017) (0.992)   
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- 0.288* 0.329 
     (0.054) (0.171) 
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob -0.001 0.0003 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.270) (0.886)     
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- -0.002** 0.0008 --- --- 
   (0.027) (0.592)   
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.003 -0.002 
     (0.115) (0.381) 
GDP growth --- -0.008 --- -0.009* --- -0.014** 
  (0.135)  (0.077)  (0.026) 
Trade   --- 0.014*** --- 0.004* --- 0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.051)  (0.333) 
Cost to export (ln) --- 0.042 --- -0.184 --- 0.123 
  (0.744)  (0.104)  (0.367) 
Foreign Direct Investment   --- -0.023** --- -0.184 --- -0.003 
  (0.034)  (0.104) --- (0.667) 
       
Net Effects  na na 0.147 na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.245) (0.044) (0.214) (0.047) (0.247) (0.088) 
AR(2) (0.347) (0.588) (0.338) (0.780) (0.346) (0.717) 
Sargan OIR (0.782) (0.038) (0.549) (0.001) (0.889) (0.024) 
Hansen OIR (0.610) (0.870) (0.606) (0.846) (0.853) (0.975) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.352) (0.965) (0.472) (0.919) (0.458) (0.914) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.669) (0.608) (0.574) (0.621) (0.891) (0.912) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.539) (0.974) (0.284) (0.807) (0.152) (0.946) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.553) (0.247) (0.628) (0.634) (0.941) (0.826) 
       
Fisher  1149.94*** 18084.18*** 1069.31*** 2336.47*** 1040.16*** 46688.72*** 
Instruments  24 37 24 37 24 37 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  305 212 305 212 305 212 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant. The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 23.379. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and implications  
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In the light of the tested hypotheses, whereas Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are valid, 
Hypothesis 2 is not valid. It follows that in order to boost technology exports, the mobile 
phone can more conveniently complement political and institutional governance than 
economic governance. It is important to note that: (i) political governance entails political 
stability/no violence and voice & accountability; (ii) economic governance embodies 
government effectiveness and the regulation quality and (iii) institutional governance 
encompasses the rule of law and corruption-control.  
More specifically, the following findings have been established. First, there are 
positive net effects on ICT goods exports from independent interactions between mobile 
phones and ‘political stability’ ‘voice and accountability’ and corruption-control. Second, 
significant net effects are not apparent from independent interactions between mobile phones 
and government effectiveness, regulation quality and the rule of law. 
In the light of the above, it is apparent that: (i) not all interactions between the mobile 
phone and governance significantly affect technology good exports and (ii) the mobile phones 
could theoretically play a role in reducing information asymmetry or informational rents 
associated with bad governance that stifle trade. The former and latter respectively constitute 
practical and theoretical implications which we discuss below. Three main practical 
implications are apparent from the findings, notably, the need to: (i) create conducive 
conditions that enhance mobile phone penetration; (ii) improve standards of governance given 
the negative skew of governance variables and (iii) enhance conditions under which the 
mobile phone complements governance channels.  
First, it is important for policy to leverage on the potential for mobile phone 
penetration to enhance governance for trade by engaging in reforms that improve the 
infrastructure needed for ICT and access constraints that limit mobile phone usage. 
Liberalising the ICT sector, promoting schemes of universal access and favouring low pricing 
17 
 
are other steps toward boosting the usage of mobile phones. This policy recommendation 
naturally builds on the fact that SSA has one of the highest (lowest) rates of ICT growth 
(penetration).  
  Second, given that most governance indicators are left-skewed, good governance 
policies will have to be enhanced in view of improving the complementary role of mobile 
phones in facilitating trade. Whereas more action is needed on the governance indicators for 
which net positive effects have not been apparent (regulation quality, the rule of law and 
government effectiveness), other governance indicators for which such net positive impacts 
have been apparent, need to be consolidated.  
 Third, our results have revealed that governance can be complemented with mobile 
phones to improve trade. Such complementarity can be boosted by the following measures. 
On the one hand, tailor the mobile phone to enhance transparency, the free flow of 
information (especially between various departments of the government) and transparency. 
On the other hand, consolidate the nexus between governance and mobile 
services/applications in order to improve information flow between government institutions 
and technology-driven corporations as well as permit such corporations to participate actively 
in policy-making on measures that influence ICT-commodity exports.  
 Given the above practical implications, the mobile phone plays an essential role in 
acting as an interface of participation between technology corporations and government 
institutions. Such potential for sharing information to reduce information asymmetry can be 
further consolidated if the mobile phone is designed to inter alia, increase: interaction, access, 
adoption, cost-effectiveness, efficiency and outreach. This leads us to the theoretical 
contribution of the study. 
 Under the intuitive and logical assumption that the mobile phone is a channel of 
information sharing that mitigates potential information asymmetry between technology 
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corporations and government institutions, the findings established in this study can be 
extended to infer that the role of the mobile phone is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings of intermediation efficiency in the banking sector by means of information 
sharing offices like public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Given the discussed 
analogy, from the perspective of export promotion and/or efficiency, the findings established 
in this study are broadly consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of enhancing banking 
intermediation efficiency through information sharing bureaus.  
 As far as managerial implications are concerned, the findings show that corporate 
governance practices need to be aligned with macroeconomic governance conditions to 
facilitate exports in technology-intensive export commodities. Hence, both fund managers and 
investors can leverage on the complementarity between the mobile phone and some 
governance dynamics in respectively taking decisions on portfolio diversification and 
investment location. Moreover, managers need to be aware of the fact that regardless of how 
robust their corporate governance structures are, it is not very likely for business to run 
smoothly if adequate means of ICT are not available. A recent example in an African country 
is Cameroon where ICT services have been disrupted by the government in the English-
speaking South western and North western regions of the country because of calls for better 
governance through civil disobedience.  As a result of the disruption, business operations in 
many start-ups in the Silicon Mountain (which is the country’s main start-up hub) have been 
grounded (Atabong, 2017).   
 
5. Conclusion, caveats and further research directions 
This study has assessed how the mobile phone influences governance to improve information 
and communication technology (ICT) exports in Sub-Saharan Africa with data from 2000-
2012.  The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and three main 
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governance concepts are used, namely: (i) institutional (comprising the rule of law and 
corruption-control); (ii) political (involving political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability) and (iii) economic (including regulation quality and government effectiveness) 
governance. The following findings have been established. First, there are positive net effects 
on ICT goods exports from independent interactions between mobile phones and ‘political 
stability’ ‘voice and accountability’ and corruption-control. Second, significant net effects are 
not apparent from independent interactions between mobile phones and government 
effectiveness, regulation quality and the rule of law.  
 The main limitation of the study is that the mobile phone complements only 
macroeconomic governance in order to improve conditions for technology exports. However, 
in the real world, technology exports depend on a host of other institutional and 
macroeconomic factors, some of which are specific to corporations. For instance corporate 
governance is as important as macroeconomic governance in enhancing corporate operations 
that drive the export of technology commodities.   
Future studies can assess whether the findings in the study are valid within the 
perspectives of reducing unemployment and promoting entrepreneurship. The future research 
recommendation essentially builds on evidence that Africa’s population is projected to double 
by 2036 and represent more than twenty per cent of the population in the world by 2050 (UN, 
2009). In essence, it has been established in recent literature that  only entrepreneurship and 
jobs from the private sector would accommodate the unemployment associated with the 
growing population in Africa in the long-term (Asongu, 2013). Furthermore, in the light of the 
sustainable development agenda, examining how the ICT penetration potential can be 
leveraged to fight unemployment and promote inclusive development is also worthwhile.    
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Technology goods exports  0.587 1.741 0.000005 20.944 420 
Mobile phone penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Educational Quality  43.601 14.529 12.466 100.236 444 
Innovation (STJA) 91.231 360.522 0.000 2915.5 480 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
Political Stability -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Trade Openness   78.109 36.252 20.964 209.874 592 
Cost of exports (ln) 7.374 0.503 6.137 8.683 375 
Foreign Direct Investment  5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 87) 
                
ICT- 
good- 
exp 
Educ STJA Internet PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPg Trade Cost of 
exp 
FDI Mobile  
1.000 -0.188 -0.011 0.165 0.121 0.241 0.268 0.225 0.084 0.314 -0.024 0.399 -0.064 0.128 0.158 ICTgoodexp 
 1.000 0.082 -0.407 -0.375 -0.372 -0.376 -0.333 -0.377 -0.402 0.101 -0.349 0.275 -0.125 -0.309 Edu 
  1.000 0.095 0.012 0.299 0.368 0.413 0.221 0.159 -0.129 -0.139 -0.049 -0.142 0.543 STJA 
   1.000 0.317 0.396 0.480 0.270 0.380 0.449 -0.053 0.406 -0.327 0.040 0.758 Internet 
    1.000 0.707 0.691 0.603 0.795 0.823 -0.031 0.480 -0.293 0.096 0.392 PolS 
     1.000 0.826 0.796 0.752 0.863 0.002 0.261 -0.339 0.059 0.580 VA 
      1.000 0.874 0.870 0.897 0.115 0.305 -0.274 0.061 0.698 GE 
       1.000 0.762 0.815 -0.019 0.215 -0.193 -0.033 0.596 RQ 
        1.000 0.891 0.062 0.383 -0.263 0.086 0.583 CC 
         1.000 0.081 0.410 -0.304 0.069 0.573 RL 
          1.000 -0.193 0.155 0.185 -0.167 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.396 0.200 0.380 Trade 
            1.000 -0.296 -0.314 Cost of exp 
             1.000 0.021 FDI 
              1.000 Mobile 
                
ICTgoodexp: ICT goods exports. Educ: Quality of primary education. STJA: Scientific & Technical Journal Articles. Internet: Internet 
penetration. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-
Control. RL: Rule of Law. GDPg: GDP growth. Trade: trade openness. Cost of exp: cost of exports. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. 
Mobile: Mobile Phone penetration.  
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Appendix 3: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
ICT good 
exports  
ICTgoode
xp 
ICT goods exports (% of total goods exports) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Educational 
Quality 
Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Innovation  STJA  Scientific and Technical Journal Articles  World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
 
Political 
Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of governments’ commitments to such policies”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
   
 
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Trade 
Openness  
Trade Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Cost of 
exports (ln)  
Cost of 
exp. 
Ln of Costoexport:  Cost to export (US$ per container) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
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